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Summary findings
Maloney,  Nufiez,  and  colleagues  provide  an overview  of  Colombian  case confirms  the evidence  offered  by kernel
minimum  wage levels in Latin America  and  their  true  density  estimates:
impact  on the  distribution  of wages,  using both  *  The  minimum  wage  can have  an important  impact
numerical  measures  and kernel  density  plots  for eight  on wage  distribution  in the neighborhood  of the
countries  (Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  minimum  wage.
Honduras,  Mexico,  and Uruguay).  They  especially  try to  *  The  effects  echo  up the wage  distributi  )n in a clear
identify  "numeraire"  effects-where  the  minimum  is  demonstration  of the  "numeraire"  effect.  That  this effect
used  as a reference  higher  in the wage  distribution-and  is stronger  in Latin America  than  in the  Uni -ed States
"lighthouse"  effects-where  it influences  wage setting  in  suggests  that  the  minimum  wage  induces  further-
the unregulated  or  "informal"  sector.  reaching  rigidities  in the labor  market.  The  tradeoff
Their  main  findings:  First,  statutory  minimum  wages  between  any possible  effect  on poverty  and  reduced
are often  misleading,  and graphical  methods  may be  flexibility  is likely to be  more  severe  in countries  where
more  reliable.  Second,  the  minimum  wage's  effect  on  this is the case.  The  effects  on employment,  and
wage setting  extends  far beyond  what  is usually  unemployment,  are substantial.
considered  and probably  beyond  the effect  in industrial  *  Informal  salaried  wages  are  also affectrd,  confirming
countries,  the graphical  evidence  of strong  lighthouse  effects.  Self-
Using panel  employment  data from  Colombia,  where  employment  earnings  are not,  however,  coI firming  that
minimum  wages  seem  high and  binding,  the authors  the  minimum  wage  is not  simply  serving  as a measure  of
quantify  the  minimum  wage's  effects  on wages  and on  inflationary  expectations.
the probability  of becoming  unemployed.  The
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(Uruguay),  Mauricio  Santamaria  (Colombia)  and Corinne Siaens (Bolivia,  Honduras). Our thanks for
helpful  comments  to Carmen  Pages.Minimum wages have again surfaced as a central issue in labor market policy in
the region. In countries such as Mexico and Brazil, the real level of the minimum wage
became so eroded over the 1980s that there is pressure to provide a "living" income  for
those  at the  lower tail  of  the  distribution.  On the  other hand,  the  high  rates  of
unemployment in some countries and the premium that more open trade postures  put on
labor market flexibility has made policy makers wary of  introducing new rigidities.
This paper first provides an overview of the levels of minimum wages in Latin
America  and  their  true  impact on  the  distribution  of  wages  using  both  numerical
measures and kemel density plots for eight countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay). In particular, it attempts to identify effects
higher in the wage distribution and for effects in the unregulated or "informal"  sector.
The central message is that the minimum wage has impacts on wage setting far beyond
those usually contemplated and likely beyond those found in the industrialized countries.
The final section then employs panel employment data from Colombia, a country where
minimum wages seem high and very binding to quantify these effects and their impact on
employment.
I.  The Importance of the Minimum Wage.
First, the redistributional effects of the minimum wage may have the potential to
reduce poverty, and foster growth. (see Freeman 1992 for a summary of the US debate).
But the larger concern in the literature is that the secondary effects through the creation
2of  new  rigidities  in  the  labor  market  and  the  potential  decrease  in  employment
opportunities may offset the wage  distribution gains.  The simplest textbook models
suggest that  putting a  wage  floor above the  equilibrium level will  lead to  a  fall in
employment. These effects have traditionally appeared to be weak in the US, perhaps
with the exception of young workers (see, for example, Brown 1988, Brown Gilroy a:-d
Kohen 1983).  However, more recent work by Currie and Fallick (1996), Abowd et.  l.
(1999)  and  Neumark  et.  al.  (2000)  report  sharp  disemployment  effects  for  those
constrained by the  minimum with  employment elasticities of  between .4  to  1.6 (in
absolute value).
The evidence from Latin America suggests large effects.  Freeman and Castillo-
Freeman's (1991) analysis of the imposition of US minimum wage norms on Puerto Rico
in  1977 suggest that  the weak  US  evidence results primarily from the  fact that  the
minimum wage  is so low as to  "nibble" rather than "bite"  at the wage distribution.
However,  when  the  minimum in  Puerto  Rico  was  raised  to  63%  of  the  average
manufacturing wage, the elasticity of employment to the minimum wage became .91 anld
raising the wage led to massive  job loss on the island. The same general picture emerges
from  Bell  (1997)  in  her  study  using  manufacturing panel  data  from  Mexico  and
Colombia.  She finds no impact of the minimum wage in  Mexico where  it was not
binding.  However, in Colombia, she finds an employment elasticity of unskilled workers
on the order of .15-.33 and for skilled workers .03-.24 with the effect on workers paid
near the minimum wage between .55 to 1.22. She concludes that, across the period 1981-
1987, the 10% rise in the minimum wage from 1981-1987 reduced low-skilled, low wage
Colombian employment in the range of 2%-12%.
3The potentially very high elasticities of those earning near the minimum wage
makes the overall impact on poverty potentially ambiguous: an elasticity over 1 implies
that total income transfers to the target groupfall with a rise in the wage.  In the US, the
evidence  is  ambiguous.  As  examples,  Card  and  Krueger  find  weakly  significant
improvements in poverty, while Neumark, et. al. (2000) find that earned incomes of low-
wage  workers decline in response to  minimum wage  increases and actually increase
poverty. 2  The debate arguably becomes more relevant in LDCs where enforcement of
labor norms is thought not to extend to the unprotected or "informal" sector.  Standard
dualistic models ranging from the earliest (Harris and Todaro 1970) to some of the most
recent (Agenor and Aizenman 1999) assume a labor market segmented by nominal wage
rigidities such as the minimum wage.  Here, the worker who loses his job has no access
to unemployment insurance and instead takes refuge in the informal sector whose wage
adjusts to accommodate supply.  In this case, a rise in the minimum wage forces some
workers into jobs earning below what they did before.  The available empirical evidence
for Latin America is ambiguous.  Morely (1992) and de Janvry and Sadoulet (1996) find
that poverty falls with a rise in the minimum, but only for periods of recovery in the
former and only  in periods of recession in the latter.  Using world wide  LDC data,
McLeod and Lustig (1996) confirm a negative effect on poverty, but also a significant
negative effect on employment as well.
The  minimum wage  also  enters  strongly  into  debates  about  the  impacts  of
mandated non-wage benefit payments  and other regulations have on labor demand.  If,
for instance, the worker fully values the health insurance provided by the employer, then
2 Their  evidence  suggests  that  the pressure  for  implementing  minimum  wages  comes  from unions  seeking
to reduce  wage  competition.
4then, in a market with no rigidities, his or her wage will fall by an equivalent amoumt.
However, in the presence of a wage floor, the mandated benefit raises total remuneral  ion
to the worker and hence reduces total demand.  In reality, most regulation can, at s:me
level, be seen as a tax on firms.  As an example, restrictions on firing implicitly deprive
the firm of an "option" to divest itself of an asset (the worker) and therefore a tax equal to
the option value.  This, could be passed down to the worker as the cost of job  security,
but not if the minimum wage is binding.
A final consideration is how minimum  wages may affect how economies adjus: to
shocks, whether through employment or wages.  In the  1994-95 Tequila crisis, Mexico
allowed  real  wages  to  be  eroded  over  25%  and  saw  only  moderate  increases  in
unemployment.  The Colombian Constitution, on the  contrary,  insists on  a  "salario
minimo mobil" which has been interpreted dictating indexation to past inflation and this
has arguably contributed to the high rates of unemployment experienced in response to
the financial crisis in 1998.
II.  Numerical Measures of the Incidence of Minimum Wages
Raw comparisons of the real minimum wage across countries are of limited use.
From both the perspective of improving equity and minimizing labor market distortions,
what  is of interest  is the  level of  the minimum wage  relative to  the distribution of
remuneration in the individual country. To argue that the minimum is "too low" becauise
it  is  a  wage  in  Brazil  fraction  of  that  in  Argentina is  irrelevant if  overall  labor
productivity differs by similar magnitudes.
5As a first cut at international comparison, Figure 1 ranks various Latin American
and OECD countries by the minimum wage standardized by the mean wage (SMW).
Latin America spans the range with Uruguay, Bolivia,  Brazil, Argentina, Chile and
Mexico with the lowest values and Venezuela, El Salvador, Paraguay and Honduras with
among the highest. 4
While informative, standardizing by the first moment is not sufficient to tell us
whether the minimum wage is binding for two reasons.  First the number of workers
affected will depend on the higher moments of the distribution as well:  more disperse
endowments of  human  capital  (variance) or  a  particularly  large  fraction  of  poorly
endowed workers  (skewness)  would lead to more workers being affected by a given
SMW.  Second, if the minimum wage is not enforced, very high SMWs are irrelevant.
As  a  second cut,  Table  1 offers several additional measures that  attempt to
provide a  more rounded view.  The first  column presents the SMW and the  second
standardizes by the wage at the 50&  quantile (median). The median  is a better measure of
the central tendency since it is less sensitive to extreme values in the upper tail and to
compression of the lower tail by the minimum wage.  Using it to standardize reverses the
SMW rankings  of  Argentina and Brazil.  This  effect  is  even more dramatic  if  we
standardize by the wage at the 1Oh  quantile of the distribution, arguably the range that is
of more concern than the center. 5 Brazil suddenly appears among the countries with the
3  Source:  For countries  discussed  in detail  here,  IBRD  staff estimates  for most recent  years available. All
others  IDB  (1999)  for  the early 1990s.
4 The analysis uses  the Permanent  Household  Survey  (EPH)  from Argentina,  the Continuous  Household
Survey  (ECH)  from Bolivia,  the National  Survey  from the Sample  of Households  (PNAD)  from Brazil,  the
(CASEN)  from  Chile,  the Multi-purpose  Permanent  Survey  (EPHM)  for Honduras,  the National  Urban
Employment  Survey  (ENEU) from  Mexico. We  restrict  the sample  to those 16-65,  working  between  30-
50  hours a week  for informal  salaried  workers  (those  working  for  firms  of five  employees  or below)  and
formal  salaried  workers  (six  workers  and above).
5  10%  of the sample  earns below  this  wage  and 90%  above.
6most potentially binding minimum (excluding Honduras), and fir  above Argentina and
Uruguay. This makes sense when it is noted that Brazil shows the highest wage variance
among countries overall, and among countries for whom the sample is purely urban.
III. Graphical Analysis-Kernel Density Plots
However  revealing  theoretically,  the  10th  quantile,  variance  and  skewness
measures are problematic since they describe the distribution after the imposition of the
minimum wage.  A graphic approach, however can reliably reveal how the distribution is
distorted.  The first panels of Figure 2 are kernel estimates of the density function with a
vertical line to  mark the location of the minimum wage. 6 Kernel Density estimatcrs
approximate the density f(x) from observations on x.  The estimator calculates the density
at the center of the weighted x's  found within a rolling interval or "window".  They
differ from histogram both in allowing the windows to overlap and by the possibility of
different weighting schemes on the x's
A~  F  X-X1]  (1) nh  Lhi
The  function K, that  determines the weights  is  termed the  "kernel".  This has  the
advantage of giving a clearer idea of the shape of the distribution, but it is sensitive to the
bandwidth chosen to smooth.  This is particularly important for detecting the impact of
minimum wages since an excessively large bandwidth will smooth exactly the  "cliff'
where the minimum wage is binding.  Some adjustments away from the default weie
necessary to present the most revealing plot.
7The second panels are the cumulative distributions of wages. These requires no
judgements about bandwidths and the vertical "cliffs" indicate where the minimum wage,
or multiples, may be influencing.  Both the informal and formal wage distributions are
plotted  in  light and  dark  lines respectively. 7 In  each graph,  a  "piling  up"  of  the
probability mass around the minimum wage suggests that the policy has, in effect, forced
a change in the distribution.
Interpretation
What  is  immediately clear  is that  minimum wages  do  have  the capacity  to
strongly alter the distribution of wages.  Colombia provides an extreme example: the
dramatic cliffs in the figures, the low standard deviation, and high skewness  (Table 1)
likely reflect the impact of the minimum wage rather than the underlying distribution of
human capital.  Somewhat in contrast to common wisdom, of the Mercosul countries,
Brazil and Chile appear to have more binding minimum wages in the formal sector than
either the very rigid Argentina, or Uruguay.
More generally, enforcement varies widely across the region and SMWs appear to
be  somewhat  deceptive measures  of  the  efficacy of  the  minimum wage  to  affect
distribution or a measures of labor market distortion. Chile and Colombia have SMW far
below that of Honduras, yet the distortion of the wage distributions in the first two  seems
dramatic in comparison. This suggests that a country's location in the range of SMWs
6 See DiNardo,  Fortin  and Lemieux  (1996)  for a thorough  treatment  of kernel  density  estimation  and Velez
and Santamaria  (1999)  for an application  of  the CDF  to Colombia.
Informal  sector  is defined  in each country  either  by whether  a salaried  worker  is un-affiliated  with social
security  systems, or works  in very small  firms  ( around  6 or less).  The Colombian  survey,  in particular,
has only  limited  data  and therefore  shows  little  difference  in means  between  the two.
8(Figure 1) is insufficient to  indicate the impact of a rise  in minimum wage and  :hat
empirical work with only the statutory measures may give a misleading picture of what's
going on.
The impact on the informal sector.
In virtually all countries, there is evidence of what Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo
(2000) term the "Efeito Farol"  or lighthouse effect on the informal distribution. 8 In faict,
the  influence seems far  stronger on  the  informal sector  than  the formal  in  Brazil,
Mexico, and in Argentina and Uruguay, countries where the wage appears irrelevant to
the formal distribution. It may be argued that the minimum wage is simply a signal of the
wage  level  in  high  inflation countries,  but  the  evidence  is  not  supportive: Brazil,
Colombia  and  Mexico have  very moderate rates  of  inflation in  the  sample period.
Though probably not enforced by law, the minimum wage appears to be an important
benchmark for "fair" remuneration.
This would seem to turn conventional conceptions of the relationship between the
informal  and  formal sectors  on their  heads-- the binding wage  floor  is  now  in  the
informal sector-- and raises new questions about the razon de ser of the informal sector.
If it is an  inferior unprotected sector, why do workers receive some benefits and  riot
others?  Why does some concept of fairness dictate that informal workers should get the
minimum, but not benefits? One possibility is that forwarded by Maloney (1999) that the
sector is as much a way of avoiding the inefficiencies of labor market regulation as the
regulations themselves.  Where there is no wage floor in the formal sector, the costs of
8 This  effect  is also  noted  by Amadeo,  Gill,  and Neri  (2000) for Brazil.
9benefits to employers may be largely passed down to workers in the form of lower wages.
If this  implicit tax is higher than the perceived benefits, then there is an  incentive to
evade and seek informal employment.  Given that informnal  workers are, on average,
substantially yoiinger than formal workers, it may be that many are still covered by their
fathers' health insurance and hence, would resist paying the implicit tax again.  Further,
the often gross inefficiencies in benefits provision drive another wedge between benefits
and implicit taxes.
This finding also suggests that the standard dualistic model that sees the flexible
informal sector wage as permitting the absorption of workers rationed out from the rigid
formal sector is seriously incomplete.  It is not clear why we shouldn't  also expect a
downward sloping demand curve in the  informal sector, and  hence that the binding
minimum wage leads to job loss there and reduced capacity to absorb the unemployed.
Again, the present Colombian situation comes to mind.  The historically unprecedented
unemployment rates may partially arise from the shock to formal production due to the
collapse of the fmancipl sector, but also the jobs lost in the informal sector with the sharp
rise in the minimum wage over the last two years.
The minimum wage as a reference  for other  formal wages.
Throughout the region it is common to use the minimum wage as a more general
unit of measure for instance for quoting wages of benefits. In Brazil, for example,  Neri et
al (2000) find strong evidence of this "numeraire" effect throughout the wage distribution
finding that  9%  of formal sector workers received exactly one  minimum wage,  but
another 6% received exactly a multiple. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay appear
10to show regular "cliffs" across the distribution that are synchronized between both the
formal and informal sectors. The next section will test more explicitly for these effects.
IV.  Econometric Evidence on the Impact of the Minimum Wage from Colombia
In this section, we follow Neumark (2000) in employing rotating panel data from
Colombia to test the impact of a rise in the minimum wage on wages and the probability
of becoming unemployed, and for numeraire effects in both.  The existence of the panel,
as well as the impression from the previous section that the minimum wage is high anid
binding made Colombia an obvious case study.
Since 1997, the National Statistical Agency (DANE) has created a rotating panel
by reinterviewing 25% of households interviewed in the previous round of the Encuesta
Nacional  de  Hogares  (ENH-National Household  Survey)  yielding  a  set  of  twio
consecutive quarterly observations on the same households.  Individuals were identified
by household and then on the basis of  gender, age, mnarital  status, relation with the head
of household, schooling level and  years of education, variables which do not  change
between quarters. The Euclidian distance from each individual  with respect to the rest of
the inhabitants of a house, is calculated and the match accepted if the distance is below a
predetermined threshold. Roughly 15% of the individuals in a survey can be linked to the
past one in 11 rotating surveys.  As table 2 shows, when we restrict to that used in the
kernel density plots-  men working 30-50 hours per  week, we have a total of  10,633
observations who are employed in the  first period.  Slightly over  19% of these will
become unemployed in the second period.  Of these, 66% report being salaried workers
and 34% report being self-employed.  Although the year chosen to estimate the kernel
11density plots  permitted separating "formal"  from  "informal"  wage  earners in  every
period, this is not  the case in other years and we combine the two in the "salaried" sector.
Roughly 25% earn below the minimum wage.  However, the vast majority of these, as
suggested in the kernel density  plots, are informal.
We examine the  self-employed as  another means of  separating general price
indexing effects  from "true"  minimum wage  effects.  If  the minimum is simply an
economy wide mechanism for coordinating prices, we might see the self-employed  using
it to  fix  their product prices.  If this were  not the case, we would expect that their
incomes would be determined by the health of their enterprise and they would not raise
their implicit "wage" at the risk of becoming uncompetitive.
The consecutive observations permit identifying the impact of the two  annual
changes in the minimum wage that occurred between 1997 and the end of the of the
available sample in 1999.9 We estimate the determinants of the percentage change in the
real hourly wage worker i receives, (dw) and the probability of becoming unemployed
(prob z=l)  across two quarters as
dw, prob(z =  1)  = E  MjR(w,,,mw,) 1[w2  1]+  MWI  R(w 1 ,mw,)  +
I  L~~~~mwl jJ(2)
A,R(wll,mwl)  ji]  +c 5 l  +iu+mi  +,
where mw is the real minimum wage respectively' 0.
9'This period  corresponds  to what  is widely  acknowledged  as the  country's  worst  employment  crisis  in the
post  war  period.
10  The  deflator  used  was  the  consumer  price  index  for  each  city.
12Though it is common to examine the impact of the minimum wage on wag -s and
employment at the minimum wage, however, the kernel density plots suggest thal there
are numeraire effects throughout the distribution.  If we are interested on the total effect
of the MW on distribution and employment, we need to look for these effects a  well.
Further, there may be general equilibrium effects through changes in the relative de rnand.
For these reasons, a vector ofj  dummy variables, R, for position ranked by real liourly
wage  in year 1, of the wage of individual i  with respect to the minimum wage (Table 2).
The first term on the right-hand-side of the equation captures the effects of a chanAge  in
the minimum wage on different regions of the wage distribution. The second permits the
level of wage growth to change by each cohort in the wage distribution, independnt  of
minimum wage effects.  The third allows us to capture (or control) changes within each
region or changes in higher levels than those defined by vector R.,
Finally, X is a vector with the individual characteristics such as gender.. age,
education, etc.,  T and A  are a set of quarterly and regional dummy variables  wvhich
capture the dependence of observations of the same period (including seasonal ef-ects)
and region, respectively.
Previous papers find that low income families receive a short run benefit when the
minimum wage increases but are negatively affected over the longer term (Neumark,  and
Wascher, 1997; Neumark et al., 1998; Neumark et al., 2000). This is because short run
adjustments are made via prices and  long run adjustments via quantities: firms  must
follow the law at first but then, if required, they fire workers.  For this reason, the lagged
minimum wage  (SM, - SMo  )/SMO  is introduced. From the point of view of measulring
these longer run impacts, it would be preferable to have, as Neumark et. al. did, a full
13year span rather than the two quarter panels the ENH offers.  This limitation may not be
as serious as appears at first for measuring the impact on wages since higher inflation
rates erode more quickly any mandated increase in the MW than in the US. It has also
been argued (Brown et al. 1982) that the high turnover in low skilled workers may imply
that employment adjustment in the most critical ranges around the minimum wage may
be relatively rapid.  Further, Maloney (1998) shows that average manufacturing tenure in
Latin America is roughly 70% of the OECD so the quantity adjustment might occur more
rapidly. Nonetheless, we put less weight in our analysis on the lags and do not follow
Neumark in generating "representative" worker responses to lagged minimum wages.
Effects  on wages
Table 3a reports the effects on real wages of a change in the real minimum wage.
on salaried workers.  The results are broadly consistent with Neumark's.  Around the
minimum wage,  the effect  is high  for  salaried workers, .87  for those  earning .7-.9
minimum wages.  Moving up the income scale, the effect remains significant up to  4
minimum wages, although with decreasing coefficients reaching .16 for those earning
more than 4 minimum wages. What is remarkable is that the effect dies off much more
slowly than in the US.  Between 2-3 minimum wages, Neumark found an impact of only
.06 %  whereas Colombia  shows .38 up to 4 minimum wages. This suggests a far greater
numeraire effect and hence  substantially greater  impact of, the minimum wage.  As
'"  Neumark  argues  that generally  speaking,  the lag has the usual interpretation  as long as long as the
individual  history  is not relevant,  that is, that the contemporary  effect of a change in the MW does not
depend  on past wages. The problem  that  he highlights  is that a rise in the minimum  wage in the previous
period may have "swept up" a worker into a different category.  Therefore,  the correct total effects
(contemporaneous  plus lagged)  needs somehow  to compensate  for individuals  changing  classification  that
involves  generating  a set of representative  workers  in each cell.
14Neumark found, very large effects are found below the minimum wage and we also do
not have an obvious explanation for this.  The self-employed show a significant effect
below the minimum wage, but overall, there appears to be little impact on the distribution
above.
The effect of a one quarter lag suggests two interesting effects.  First, that across
the wage distribution there is a significant, and broadly uniform (-17%)  erosion of the
first period effect, perhaps due to inflation.  lagged minimum wage has a negative effect
for both samples.  This suggests that we cannot take the impact effect as the wage rise
that firms will use in making employment decisions. Second, again the impact on the self
employed is virtually never significant and the magnitude are roughly a third of those for
salaried workers.  This suggests that not only do the self employed not respond strongly
to  lighthouse effects, but that they update their  "wages" frequently to  avoid inflation
erosion.  This, in fact, may be one of the advantages of being self-employed vs. salaried
in high inflation environments.
Effects on Employment
Table 3b shows the consequent effects on employment. Equation (2) is run again,
but this time as a logit where if the individual is assigned a value of 1 if he retains his job
and a 0 if he is without a job in the second quarter.
The results are consistent with the wage regressions. A rise in the minimum wage
has a statistically very significant impact on the probability of becoming unemployed that
again decreases with a rising position in the wage distribution.  The lags echo this pattern
15and  suggest  that,  as  might  be  expected,  the  adjustment  does  not  take  place
instantaneously. On average, the contemporaneous effect is roughly twice that found by
Neumark for the US and, again, extends far higher in the distribution. Corresponding to
the  apparent  impact on  the  wages  of  the  very  lowest  ranges  of  the  self-employed
distribution, there  are negative impacts on employment as well as some impacts higher
in  the  distribution.  Figure  3  graphs  both  the  impact on  wages  and  unemployment
probability by position in the distribution.
The  regressions,  therefore,  suggest  statistically  very  significant  effects  on
employment and magnitudes of effect far larger than those seen in the US.  However,
since they measure the impact on the flow out of employment, they cannot answer the
question of what happens to the total stock of jobs. As a very rough first approximation,
we run equation 2 again, but eliminating the R dummies so as to get the "average" effect
(integrating under the wage distribution in table 3a) of the minimum wage. The average
contemporaneous impact is .64 and lagged is -.17 leaving a total effect of .47 % rise in
wages.  We then multiply this by Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) estimate of the LR own
wage elasticity of blue collar manufacturing employment of .32.  If there is no further
inflationary erosion,  this  would imply an  elasticity of  employment with  respect to
minimum wage of .15.  This is consistent with Bell's estimates and suggests that the 9%
rise in minimum wage in 1999 would have had the effect of  reducing employment by
1.4%.
16V. Conclusion
The  Colombian  case  confirms the  evidence  offered  by  the  kernel  density
estimates.  First,  the  minimum wage  can  have  an  important  impact on  the  wage
distribution in the neighborhood of the minimum wage.  Second, the effects echo up the
wage distribution in a very clear demonstration  of the "numeraire" effect.  That this effect
is far  stronger than  found by Neumark in  the US  suggests that the  minimum wage
induces further reaching rigidities in the labor market and that the trade off between any
possible effect on poverty and reduced flexibility is likely to be more severe in Latin
America.  The employment effects are shown to be large as a result. The data did noi
allow testing of the impacts on informal salaried sector wages, but the kernel density
plots speak convincingly about the light-house effect and the potentially greater impaci
on the informal sector.  In sum, the minimum wage has impacts both in the higher
reaches of the formal distribution and in the  informal labor markets that magnify its
distortionary effects beyond that previously  thought.
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Ninimum WageTable 1: Summary Statistics on Minimum Wages and Wage Distributions
|  date  mw/mean  mw/50th  mw/I 0th  std.  dev.  skewness
Argentina (U)  1998  0.26  0.33  0.67  0.67  0.53
Bolivia  1997  0.22  0.34  0.80  0.80  0.51
Brazil  1998  0.24  0.43  1.00  0.86  0.61
Brazil (U)  1998  0.22  0.37  1.00  0.71  0.60
Chile  1996  0.34  0.55  1.09  0.77  0.58
Colombia (U)  1998  0.40  0.68  1.00  0.51  1.16
Honduras  1999  0.62  0.90  2.26  0.80  -0.14
Mexico (U)  1999  0.34  0.48  0.87  0.64  0.83
Uruguay (U)  1998  0.19  0.27  0.64  0.72  0.06
Source: IBRD Staff Estimates,  U=Urban areas only. Samples include workers between
16-65 years of age working 30-50 hours as salaried workers.
Table  2: Colombia-Distribution  of Sample by Salary Range
Men who work 3  0-50 hours per week
Salary ito MW  Employed  in t--1  Unemployed  in t=2
0.0 - 0.5  559  6.24%  267  15.99%
0.5 - 0.7  574  6.40%  229  13.71%
0.7 - 0.9  1112  12.41%  237  14.19%
0.9-  1.1  1444  16.11%  235  14.07%
1.1 - 1.3  1095  12.22%  145  8.68%
1.3  - 1.5  536  5.98%  85  5.09%
1.5 - 2.0  965  10.77%  132  7.90%
2.0-  3.0  1121  12.51%  155  9.28%
3.0 - 4.0  455  5.08%  49  2.93%
> 4.0  1102  12.29%  136  8.14%
Total  8963  100%  1670  100%Table 3a: Colombia- Effect of a 1% Rise in the Minimum Wage on Hourly Salaries
Men who work 30-50 hours per week
Salary ito MW  Self-Employed  Lag  Salaried  Lag
0.0 - 0.5  0.9860 ***  -0.0653 ***  1.7411 ***  -0.1191
0.5 - 0.7  1.0695 **  0.0796  1.2325 ***  -0.1865 **
0.7 - 0.9  1.1598  0.0486  0.8723 ***  -0.1576 *
0.9 - 1.1  1.2723  0.0563  0.5971 ***  -0.1746 *
1.1 - 1.3  0.4563  0.0583  0.6607 ***  -0.1618 *
1.3 - 1.5  0.1591  0.0652  0.2861 **  -0.1806 *
1.5 - 2.0  0.7346  0.0597  0.3896 ***  -0.1794 *
2.0 - 3.0  0.4508  0.0626  0.3528 ***  -0.1816 *
3.0 - 4.0  0.1242  0.0680  0.3848 **  -0.1654 *
>  4.0  0.0843  0.0703  0.1611 ***  -0.1736 *
Average  0.6378 ***  -0.1696 ***
Nobs  2744  5267
Table 3b: Colombia- Effect of a 1% Rise in the Minimum Wage on the Probability
of Becoming Unemployed
Men who work 30-50 hours per week
Salary ito MW  Self-Employed  Lag  Salaried  Lag
0.0 - 0.5  -0.2259 ***  -0.2205 ***  -0.3566 ***  -0.3462 ***
0.5 - 0.7  -0.2207 ***  -0.2160 ***  -0.3151 ***  -0.3035 ***
0.7 - 0.9  -0.1611 **  -0.1541 **  -0.2715 ***  -0.2615 *
0.9-  1.1  -0.0921  -0.0847  -0.2765 ***  -0.2595 ***
1.1-  1.3  -0.1182  -0.1206*  -0.2298***  -0.2169***
1.3 - 1.5  -0.1378 *  -0.1327 **  -0.2933 ***  -0.2890 *
1.5 - 2.0  -0.1044  -0.0988  -0.0967  -0.0623
2.0 - 3.0  -0.0620  -0.0505  -0.1962 **  -0.1675 **
3.0 - 4.0  -0.0408  -0.0343  -0.2530 ***  -0.2204 **
>4.0  -0.0695  -0.0653  -0.1969 *  -0.1933 **
Nobs  3128  5835
Note:  ***  significant at 1%,  ** at 5%, * at 10%.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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